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Instrumentalist Policymaking: Policy
Criteria in a Transactional Context
F. Gregory Hayden
As an extension of my recent policymaking chapter, Institutionalist
Policymaking [Hayden 1993, 283-331], this paper deals with policy
criteria in an instrumentalist or pragmatist framework. The works of
Charles Peirce and Thorstein Veblen emphasized criteria-Peirce with ex-
plicit discussion of their character and Veblen with active application in
his evaluations of various economies and institutions. Few scholars have
continued in their tradition; Seymour Melman [1983], with his excellent
Veblenian application of criteria in industrial policy studies, is a notable
exception. Interest in the subject of criteria, except by individualist
philosophers, has been scarce in the twentieth century until recently.
Thirty years ago, it was unique to find a discussion of criteria even briefly
presented in books concerned with policymaking, planning, political
science, economics, and the like. Today, such discussion has become much
more robust. Given the fact that we are the political descendants of the
Greeks, one might have expected evaluative criteria to have been a major
concern all along.
As the interest in the subject has grown, so has the breadth of its
definition. In current literature, the term "criteria" is often used inter-
changeably with standards, goals, decision rules, particle levels, and so
forth. For the purpose here, its original definition as standards for judg-
ment is recaptured-policy judgment in this case. In a policy paradigm,
policy criteria are prior to policy evaluation, and policy evaluation is prior
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to and determines the establishment of goals, program standards,
decision rules, and so forth. Or stated differently, we need to judge policy
before we can know what goals, decision rules, or particle standards are to
be implemented. For example, applying the decision rule of producing
where marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits is not a policy judg-
ment. The judgments have been made prior to that decision by estab-
lishing a system that calls for such a misguided rule.
In general, decision making, and therefore decision sciences, should
not be elevated to the level of policy judgments and policymaking. Refined
mathematical representations can be developed for the parameters and
variables of some decision rules; policy judgments are not so rote or
devoid of social process dynamics. Senator John Kerry recently articu-
lated the difference well during a televised hearing when, in response to a
statement, he said, "I want to know how you made the judgment, not how
you made the decision. What judgment and wisdom guided you?"
Normative Criteria Should Guide Research
We have learned from semiotics that a connection exists between the
conditions of signification and the conditions of validity and verification.
The interpretation of signs influences what is believed to be valid. In the
West, prior to Peirce, the analysis for determining the connection between
signification and validity was completed through dichotomous or dualistic
analysis. Peirce developed a trichotomy for understanding signs, objects,
words, or ideas. For him, such understanding is an action or "cooperation
of three subjects, a sign, its object and its interpretant" [Peirce 1931, 484].
The interpretant is the social and cultural content that guides interpreta-
tion. As Umberto Eco stated, "The content has to be defined as a cultural
unit (or as a cluster or a system of interconnected cultural units)" [Eco
1979, 62]. One of our basic problems is how to touch such content. The
meaning of signs, objects, words, and ideas "is linked to a cultural order,
which is the way in which society thinks, speaks and, while speaking, ex-
plains the 'purport' of its thought through other thoughts" [Eco 1979, 61].
Knowing the cultural and social world is not possible in the ontological
sense. "Every attempt to establish what the referent of a sign is forces us
to define the referent in terms of an abstract entity which moreover is
only a cultural convention" [Eco 1979, 66]. The instrumental conception of
criteria can be defined as an interpretant of social beliefs. Criteria stand
between beliefs and interpretations of policy. The discoveries and refine-
ments in semiotics since Peirce have given rise to a more comprehensive
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and multidimensional n-chotomy to replace his trichotomy. In a similar
manner, we need to take account ofthe multidimensionality of criteria.
Normalized beliefs and social myths guide the selection of research
problems and the articulation of normalized criteria. Normative criteria
in turn should guide the research agenda if the research is going to be
helpful in making policy for the relevant social context. Thus, we might
visualize (knowing the danger of two dimensional metaphors) the process
as displayed in Figure 1.
Criteria Are to Be Consistent with Cultural
Values and Social Beliefs
As outlined in Figure 1, there is a core of cultural values that are the
ultimate criteria for the beliefs and myths of a social system. The
anthropological literature, at least since the 1920s, has clarified the dis-
tinction between culture and society and therefore between cultural
values and social beliefs. The cultural values are the dominant core and
seldom change, especially in a policymaking period. Societies, as they
change, through policy initiatives or otherwise, continue to be reformu-
lated to make institutions and social beliefs consistent with the cultural
values. Being aware of the cultural values and explicitly incorporating
them into the design and determination of beliefs and policy criteria will
Figure 1. Social Policy A: Antitrust Area
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assist in avoiding unnecessary social tension, alienation, strife, and 
numerous reformulations. The same is true for dominant core social 
beliefs if they are not going to be challenged or changed. 
The unchanging cultural core is expressed differently as society evol- 
ves, even though the cultural values remain stable. Closely associated 
with the core values are dominant social beliefs with which other social 
beliefs are to be consistent. In different areas, i.e., antitrust policy or fami- 
ly policy, there are belief clusters that conform to the basic beliefs and 
values and are enforced in the institutional process for that area, for ex- 
ample, through legal codification, judicial decisions, working rules, and so 
forth. Figure 1 indicates a social belief cluster for the antitrust area. It is 
mainly due to infringements on the belief clusters that problems (meaning 
the failure of institutions, behavior, or attitudes to conform to beliefs) are 
defined, although beliefs can also be identified as a problem. Of course, 
there are cases where institutions and beliefs are inconsistent with the 
more dominant beliefs. Those are more serious problems than when the 
inconsistency is with less dominant beliefs, many times resulting in 
violent activity before the problem is solved. 
As displayed in Figure 1, the policy criteria for an area are to be 
relevant to the problem context and consistent with social belief criteria 
and with the social desires and ends that define the problem. Mark Ok- 
rent has explained that, for the pragmatist, the web of beliefs alone is not 
sufficient for consistency. "Rather, it is a web of beliefs and desires, or 
ends. Pragmatists understand mind and language in terms of action. 
When we think of behavior as action, we think of it as performed for the 
sake of some end, in light of some beliefs, and the behavior is action only 
to the extent that the beliefs and desires of the agent together make the 
action reasonable or rational" [Okrent 1993, 3921. Criteria are drawn in 
order to guide the action of evaluating to determine whether policy is 
reasonable. "In actual practice the problem itself specifies or generates (as 
inquiry proceeds) the criteria of its resolution . . ." [Schlagel 1986,2361. In 
this way, the policy criteria will allow for policy evaluation without en- 
countering continuous circularity or infinite regress of criteria. 
Criteria Are Not Bound to a Path of Circular 
Indeterminacy or Infinite Regress 
Some have held that application of criteria is impossible because of the 
inevitable path of circular indeterminacy, while others have held the same 
because any attempt to apply criteria is a path of infinite regress. As 
Robert Lehe clarified the proposition, "It seems that we can not defend 
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any proposed criterion without already having the knowledge that the
criterion was supposed to allow us to identify" [Lehe 1989, 112]. He con-
tinues:
Rational justification consists in appealing to a standard of
rationality, so the problem arises how any such standard can itself
be rationally justified. If the standard is justified by an appeal to it-
self, then the proposed justification is viciously circular. To appeal
to another standard occasions the question concerning the legiti-
macy of that standard. So that standard must be justified by an ap-
peal to itself or by appealing to yet another standard. We seem to be
stuck with a choice between an infinite regress and a vicious circle.
The problem of the criterion thus constitutes an attack not only on
our understanding of the concept of knowledge, but also on the pos-
sibility ofjustifying any conception of rationality [Lehe 1989, 113].
Not Circular Indeterminacy
I do not know the origin of the circular indeterminacy argument
regarding criteria, although Montaigne is often quoted. To explain this
circularity, a simplified abstraction is often made of the real social world
to convert it into a world of only three entities-a fruit, usually an apple
(but sometimes a pear), a criterion (but seldom criteria), and an actor
(who is usually not mentioned) whose only act is to apply the criterion.
The criterion is to be applied to determine acceptable apples. Robert
Amico paraphrased the dilemma as follows:
But how could you ever tell whether your criterion for sorting ap-
ples was a good criterion, one that really selected out only the good
ones or only the bad ones? It seems that in order to tell whether or
not you have a good criterion, you already need to know which ap-
ples are good and which are bad; then you could test proposed
criteria by their fidelity to this knowledge.
So, if you don't already know which apples are good and which are
bad, how can you ever hope to sort them out correctly? And if you
already know which are good and which are bad, by what criteria
did you learn this? [Amico 1988,218].
Thus, in Roderick Chisholm's opinion, "The problem of the criterion has
no solution" [Chisholm 1988, 234].
Walter Neale has warned us to be careful of our metaphors if we are
not to be misled by them. The apple-criterion-actor trio metaphor is a case
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in point; yet, in spite of its being misleading, it has stimulated the writing
of numerous and sundry articles. Although a popular trio in philosophy
journals, I have never seen it operating in the halls of Congress or creat-
ing indecision at the produce counter of the grocery store. John R. Com-
mons cautioned us against the illusion of certainty of such simple models
because they give "rise to metaphysical 'entities' and 'substances' con-
ceived as existing apart from and independent of the behavior of officials
and citizens" [Commons 1969, 124-125].
In Chisholm's work, the word "policy" is substituted for the word "ap-
ples" without concern for the drastic contextual, substantive, and symbolic
differences between the two, and thus he concludes that the application of
policy criteria is not possible. However, if we look at a real-world context
of apple policy, we find a different situation.
The policy criteria are not designed by looking at apples, nor are they
designed by an actor. First, the criteria for a good apple in the United
States are the consequence of many different overlapping institutions,
knowledge bases, and competing interests that include government agen-
cies, research universities, regulatory agencies, consumer protection
groups, health advocates, technological systems, labor unions, nutrition
researchers, growers' cooperatives and their attorneys, environmental
protection agencies and their attorneys, foreign trade inspectors, advertis-
ing agencies, fertilizer and pesticide production corporations, and so forth.
And there are lobbyists, scientists, government and university analysts,
and billions of dollars associated with all of those institutional processes.
They are all involved in designing, refining, testing, creating, and apply-
ing the criteria for judging apples. Second, the apple design criteria that
are conveyed to scientists in universities, such as shelf life, color, shine,
bruisability, nutrition, size conformity, herbicide and pesticide tolerance,
and health risk, do not come from the apple. We do not observe apples to
find the criteria. The criteria are determined through socioeconomic
processes. We did not need to find an apple to know a good apple; the kind
of apple wanted did not exist. It was to be created by policy-driven science.
Advanced technology, of course, plays a major role in our beliefs about
the kind of tree that ought to exist. When it became clear that a machine
could grasp a tree by the trunk and shake the fruit from it, the question
became, can a tree be designed to withstand the shaking and its fruit to
resist the bruising? The answer in some cases was yes. Of course, the kind
of criteria Seymour Melman emphasized in his "Technological Bill of
Rights" were not applied [Melman 1983, 143].
Which criteria should dominate? That is the real question-not the cir-
cularity one. Or to state in terms of semioticians who deal in real-world
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signs and meaning, we know a sign by the interpretant of the referent (ob-
ject). We do not know the sign of X by the sign ofX. We do not know good
apples by looking at apples. Amico paraphrased Chisolm's view on cir-
cularity as follows: "It seems that in order to tell whether or not you have
a good criterion you already need to know which apples are good and
which are bad ..." [Amico 1988, 208]. Chisolm's mistake was in defining
criteria by which rather than by characteristics and qualities. The mere
coincidence of a property with a given class, such as apples or policy, "is
generally insufficient to warrant calling that characteristic a criterion of
quality. Logically there must be some epistemological connection between
the property and the valuation as well" [Sadler 1985, 292]. Selected ap-
ples will reflect the criteria. We know the sign of X (X's signification) by
the interpretant ofX.
Consistency between criteria and policy evaluation also should not be
labeled as circular. It is not circular to say that a tractor and a plow must
be technologically consistent to function together. A call for consistent
linkage does not mean that a tractor and plow are the same. Likewise, it
is not circular to say that we can judge policy as acceptable when it is con-
sistent with criteria. The criteria stand between the social system and the
policy evaluation. "Instead of there being anything strange or paradoxical
in the existence of situations in which means are constituents of the very
end-objects they have helped to bring into existence, such situations occur
whenever behavior succeeds in intelligent projection of ends-in-view that
direct activity to resolution of the antecedent" [Dewey 1939,49].
Not Infinite Regress
Upon contemplating criteria, it appears to some, as mentioned above,
that there is an infinite regress of criteria because behind every criteria it
is necessary to have criteria to judge the criteria, and behind that criteria
it would be necessary to have another set of criteria, and so on to the
world of infinity. Thus, the task is an endless regress and therefore impos-
sible.
Peirce contributed to this with his fascination with infinite regress. He
wrote: "The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a repre-
sentation. In fact it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as
stripped of irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely
stripped off; it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is
an infinite regress here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as repre-
sentation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series" [Peirce
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1931,492]. That does not follow except by the application of classical logic,
which does not have much to do with the real world. Cultures and social
systems are not structured by some logic or objective rule. The social
world has not been kept in such a quandary. We are saved from series to
infinity by the way the world works.
First, if we return to Figure 1, we see criterial regress is stopped in one
direction by social beliefs and values. Social beliefs are given by society
and serve as the criteria for policy criteria.
If we look at Figure 2 (of which Figure 1 is a part), we see that infinite
regress is stopped in another direction by the other societal policy areas
that surround the antitrust interest of Social Policy A. The policy criteria
for evaluating policy for antitrust is to be consistent with the beliefs,
policy criteria, and evaluation in all the other societal areas in Figure 2.
For example, antitrust policies are not separate from family policies (So-
cial Policy B). Antitrust policies could allow prices to reach such a level
that most families could not maintain a real income sufficient to support
family needs. An example is the failure of the Reagan and Bush ad-
ministrations to enforce antitrust regulations of prescription drugs, thus
allowing prices in the United States to rise to a level from six to ten times
greater than those in England and Germany, respectively, for the same
drugs. Or, on the other hand, policies enforcing fierce competition may
push prices so low that corporations must destroy the ecological system
(Social Policy E) in order to lower costs to meet the low prices.
A third aspect with which criteria are to be consistent is different so-
cial arrangements and different social beliefs of different groups that
share the same cultural values. The multidirectional concerns in estab-
lishing criteria are not limited to cases where there are common beliefs.
This could be demonstrated by the overlap of more than one Figure 2,
each with the same culture but different societal beliefs. This pluralistic
concern has often been incorrectly referred to as multiculturalism; it is
more correctly termed multisocietalism. The concern for pluralism "en-
tails the use of multiple sets of evaluative criteria ..." [Pankrantz 1993,
22] for resolving policy questions. Within a nation, with a common cul-
ture, different beliefs and institutions exist among different groups if
freedom of varying associations is allowed. Belgium is a good example,
with distinct religious groups that have the same culture. Institutions and
laws can vary from nation to nation with the same culture, or from state
to state, region to region, or religion to religion with the same culture. In
the United States, agricultural policy that fits the Amish of Pennsylvania
may not fit the wheat farmers of Montana or Cargill's corporate hog fac-
tories of the high plains. If free association and differences in the struc-
Instrumentalist Policymaking: Policy Criteria
Figure 2. Six Integrated Social Policy Areas
369
370 F. Gregory Hayden
ture of association is a Western belief, then policies should reflect those
differences, and the formation of policy criteria for evaluating them
should be guided by the differences. As the technological society advances,
we can expect even greater variation in the kinds of association and
beliefs among groups.
Finally, formation of policy criteria is constrained in some areas by the
overlap of policies with other cultures, either within a nation or transna-
tionally. This multicultural concern could be demonstrated with the over-
lap of more than one Figure 2, each with different cultures and usually
with different societal beliefs. Within the United States, the Amish farmer
in Pennsylvania and Cargill's corporate hog executives are of the same
Western culture. Yet, within the United States, cultures different from
the mainstream culture with different cultural values are a reality; for ex-
ample, the nations-within-the-nation of the Native Americans. Likewise,
cultural differences are to be found between nations, as in the case of
India and the United States. (A modeling of the latter kind of cultural dif-
ferences and overlap was explained in a paper delivered at the 1994
AFEE meeting by Richard Adkisson and Dilmus James [1994].)
In summary, infinite regress is not the problem in criteria design. Cul-
tures, societies, and the institutional overlap of the same do not provide
for such mental meandering. The arduous task is to define, design, and
apply criteria consistent with all the overlapping policy concerns for a so-
cial group and across various groups and cultures. The issue is one of con-
straint, and whether a set of criteria is adequate depends on what
surrounds the policy area. Constraint is the overwhelming issue-not the
freedom of regress. If the real institutional constraints are not recognized
and heeded, then some groups will be severely harmed as policy criteria
are narrowly focused on misguided beliefs. No better example of narrowly
focused criteria can be found than in the well-known Lawrence Summers
memo in which he selected money making as the dominant policy
criterion and therefore judged that it was efficient to create health
hazards for low-income black people in Africa and ecological damage for
their habitat [Summers 1993, 66]. These kinds of conclusions are not new
in neoclassical economics. The same policy criterion of money making was
utilized by Burton Weisbrod, a few decades prior to Summers, to
demonstrate that the value of keeping young white males in school was
four times that for young black females. Thus, he concluded that no spe-
cial effort should be made to educate the latter [Weisbrod 1965, 125-143].
The lack of concern at the policy level for multisocietalism and multicul-
turalism results from a lack of emphasis on multidimensional criteria in
policy evaluation.
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The influence of semiotics literature is partially responsible for con-
cepts such as infinite regress and continuous circularity gaining credence
in the understanding and application of criteria. The literature of semi-
otics is full of warnings against using misleading simplistic or logical
metaphors for the interpretation and meaning of ideas and ideals. Yet
that same literature does not always practice what it signs. Eco can be
used as an example. He states that a cultural and social system "con-
tinuously, translates signs into other signs, and definitions into other
definitions, words into icons, icons into ostensive signs, ostensive signs
into new definitions, new definitions into propositional functions, proposi-
tional functions into exemplifying sentences and so on" [Eco 1979,71]. He
adds that the social system proposes in this way to its members an
uninterrupted chain of social units that translates and explains each
other [1976]. Thus, Eco has proposed a metaphor consistent with Figures
1 and 2-concepts linked together explaining, defining, and constraining
each other like an uninterrupted chain. Note that he did not say words
into icons and icons into words. Yet, elsewhere Eco has utilized the
rhetoric and metaphor of continuous circularity. In this case, Eco's
metaphor is incorrect. It implies a continuous indeterminacy because of
circularity, just as Peirce's infinite series metaphor implies that we can
never make criteria operational because their verification can never be
finalized.
One of the reasons that abstract metaphors, such as infinite regress,
have developed that are so misleading for policymaking is because the
authors have divorced themselves from the institutional reality of
policymaking. The more we are in the real world bumping shoulders with
labor leaders, being handled by lobbyists, haranguing assistants to find a
data base, meeting with religious leaders, calling think tanks and univer-
sity professors for relevant theory, arguing with farmers in hog show
arenas, being heckled in steel mills, being challenged at legislative hear-
ings, being visited by advocacy group attorneys with threats of lawsuits,
and facing opposing scientists on television-the more there is of real-
world involvement-the less there is an opportunity for refined and
simplified metaphors such as circularity and regress to take over.
The more abstract the metaphors, the less reliable; they often do not
even give the correct direction. Abstraction means "removing the clutter."
That clutter, however, is the social life process, and no idea has legitimacy
except as it is embedded in a life process. Power bumps, mental jostling,
and legal body checks on our body of theory all help to dissolve simple
abstract metaphors and replace them with the complex ones correspond-
ing to the real world. If policy criteria are to be based on social ideas, then
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social experience is necessary for designing and naming criteria. As Peirce
stated: "The procedures leading from a bunch of experiences to a name is
the same as that which leads from the experience of things to that sign of
things, the idea. Ideas are already a semiotic product" [Peirce in Eco 1979,
166]. For policy criteria, ideas need to be the semiotic product of a heavy
dose of real-world policy experience.
Criteria and Contextual Shift
Being able to set aside circularity and infinite regress still leaves us
with the intimidating task of designing criteria consistent with the new
beliefs and institutions that will be necessary to solve a problem. Making
new beliefs the locus of concern, I refer to as the contextual-shift aspect of
policy criteria. Earlier it was explained that criteria are to be consistent
with belief clusters in the relevant context, yet problem solving usually re-
quires changes in institutions, beliefs, and technology-that is, it requires
changes in the context. There is no contextual shift if the problem can be
solved by selecting policies that will align and strengthen the bonds of
current institutions and beliefs. If, however, the socioeconomic problem is
more pronounced, a common situation is for the policy criteria to be con-
sistent with current beliefs, thereby selecting policy arrangements that
perpetuate the problem or make it worse. Institutions usually need to be
changed to solve problems. This means a major task of any policy analysis
is to design a set of criteria that will be consistent with the new set of
beliefs and institutions necessary for solving the problem. As the contex-
tual shift is taking place, new technology, or other disruptions, can change
the context markedly. This is why technology assessment, prior to innova-
tion, is crucial. The faster disruptions happen, the less opportunity for the
instrumental research process to gain an understanding of the most
reasonable policy and the less opportunity for the policy to be successful.
This contextual-shift approach to policy analysis calls for an extensive
and expensive investment in policy research. Although expensive, the al-
ternative of committing billions of dollars on resources for misaligned
policies that fail is even more expensive, very frustrating, and harmful to
citizens as well. The research is necessary for designing and refining the
criteria so that policy will lead to a new context consistent with the needs
of the whole social matrix. The research modeling must be iterative be-
cause it will need to be constantly revised as new knowledge and informa-
tion are found. Irrespective of the extent of research, an overarching
pragmatic criterion is that "it is not until after one has acted on certain
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hypotheses that the situation will eventuate which will either confirm or
disconfirm the proposed solution" [Schlagel 1986, 232; original in italics].
One of the basic assumptions of democracy is that we will make policy
mistakes. That is one of the reasons the quick reaction expressed in a
democracy is necessary. Given the task at hand, we can be assured that
mistakes will be made because the policy criteria were designed for a
world that does not yet exist. When we begin to implement that world,
there are sure to be mistakes in both the criteria that were selected and
the institutional arrangements. To fulfil the iterative process, procedures
for constant monitoring of policy consequences and subsequent reformula-
tion of policies and programs are necessary. "One cannot know prior to
taking actions whether they will eventuate in the desired consequences
because the confirming state of affairs not only does not exist when the
question of the truth of a particular solution is raised, but its very exist-
ence is contingent upon many interrelated factors, one of which is the par-
ticular procedure or procedures one takes ... in dealing with the problem"
[Schlagel 1986, 232]. The function of democracy cannot be fulfilled in a
vacuum. Policies must be implemented to test them and to improve the
social modeling. If the social modeling is not ongoing, guidance will not be
available for the democratic policymakers. This means a major part of
policy analysis will be to study the community structural changes that
take place as a result of the application of a set of criteria, and their
resulting policies, and to change the criteria if they lead to undesirable
consequences.
This criteria development process is consistent with what Paul Dale
Bush has explained in more general terms as the evolution from cere-
monial to instrumentally warranted patterns of behavior [Bush 1983,34-
39]. In the policy research process, this means the initial criteria selected
will be more ceremonial than the final set of criteria. As Bush states, in-
strumental standards of judgment "are validated in the continuity of the
problem-solving process" [Bush 1987, 1080].
Criteria as Process
No attempt is being made here to contend, as some who were trying to
save the foundationalist view have stated, that criteria can be interpreted
and applied objectively. First, objectivity is not wanted; the purpose is for
normative criteria to be applied. (In addition, no super race with the
powers of objective interpretation and application is being assumed. Per-
sons with the kind of personality or ideology that leads them to want to
pursue objective truth should probably be considered dangerous because
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too often they find it.) Consistency with social criteria is the goal of policy
judgments. The refinement of the interpretation and application of
criteria is achieved through discretionary processes made up of legislative
bodies, judicial proceedings, research inquiries, advocacy efforts, and so
forth. The validity of the interpretation and application of criteria de-
pends on the extent of social processing, or social interference if you will.
Marc Tool explained that what is required is a criterion of judgment that
draws on and is reflective of experience and a continuously refined
product of reasoned reflection [Tool 1979, 289]. The reflection of ex-
perience and the resulting challenge to criteria and their interpretation
come swiftly in a democracy, as do the counter challenges. The challenges
are swift because consequences are real and not necessarily pleasant for
all parties involved. The process, called democracy, is what I have heard
some institutionalists refer to as being too "messy" to allow for a policy
science. Quite the opposite is the case. The democratic process refines
criteria so that more refined analysis and evaluation is possible. In the
policy world, refinement and order are the consequences of conflict within
discretionary processes.
The One Best Way Is Not Viable
Conflicting strands have been interwoven through the fabric of the so-
cial sciences that revolve around whether there is "one best way." One
strand has emphasized that new technology requires a new social struc-
ture and process that is consistent with the new technology. This implies
that there is one best way for society to be structured. Coexisting with
this is the view that instrumentalism requires democracy, which allows
for alternative kinds of associations. In a democracy, different groups
structure their associations and behavior quite differently. The Fordism
studies and the Tavistock sociotechnical studies in Europe found that
automobile plants with similar technology in different countries have very
different social structures and social relationships in the plants. In addi-
tion, from observation we recognize that modern technology encourages
even greater diversity among the social structures of different groups.
Much of the frustration of Western global policy analysts, after the dis-
solution of the Soviet-United States dominance system, is because so
many countries and social groups have structured themselves according to
models that do not coincide with the one best way envisioned by Western
analysts. The general problem with much analysis is the "search for
criteria that are appropriate to all cases in the genre" [Sadler 1985, 282].
As Sadler explains, it is a mistake to assume that "commonality" is the
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principle that is taken to validate a set of criteria [1985, 292]. This is not
possible unless the cases are the same. "But as the variety of cases ex-
pands, the probability that a common set of criteria will be uniformly ap-
plicable decreases, simply because the number of potential criteria which
could be drawn upon is large" [1985, 292].
I would speculate that the idea for the "one best way," or "the op-
timum" as the neoclassical economist would say, comes to us not from ob-
servation, but rather from the same tradition that gave us "objective
truth." Beginning with Plato, the Greeks fashioned their gods according to
mathematical form, and the Romans and Christians continued the tradi-
tion. This was carried into science and analysis in the Western world be-
cause early science was an extension of religion, and like religion, science
was searching for the truth-the one truth-the one objective truth accord-
ing to mathematical form [Olson 1995, chap. 1]. The mistaken idea that
there is one acceptable set of beliefs and criteria has had a long history in
philosophy. As Chisholm stated the proposition: "If we find a pair of
beliefs that contradict each other, we will reject at least one of them"
[Chisholm 1988,233].
If we believe in (or have) discretionary democracy and free association,
and if new technology allows for more diversity, then numerous different
social structures are viable. Thus, the job of designing policy criteria also
becomes much more difficult. A single set of criteria for health care policy,
for example, is not possible. A different set of criteria is needed for each
context, and a still different set where the contexts overlap. What we will
attempt to accomplish with policies in the United States will differ
depending on whether it is for the Amish, the Mormons, recent Somalian
immigrants, the Winnebagos, or Orthodox Jews. It may be satisfying to
read neat little formulae, as often presented in the literature of our
profession, for policymaking. However, it accomplishes little more than to
please psychological predilections. Reality is much more complex. An
economist stated at one of our meetings that the Social Fabric Matrix just
brings too much detail into the analysis. That detail is what planners and
civil servants work with every day in the bureaucracies of our city, coun-
ty, state, and national governments where they are constantly monitored
and challenged on a daily basis by the citizenry and the citizenry's covey
oflawyers. An old cliche is that the devil is in the details; so is good policy.
A reality of policy criteria is the detail of numerous different kinds of
group contexts. The only alternative that I can conceive of for avoiding
this kind of messiness (as it is often called) is the one-best-way solution,
as has been attempted during some of the darker and more brutal eras of
human history.
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For too long, the general idea that compromise and common ground is
the solution has frustrated good policymaking. While compromise and
common ground are essential for a democracy to function, that does not
mean that one policy or a unified common ground should be sought to be
enforced throughout the social setting. As I heard former President
Jimmy Carter say recently, when interviewed for a televised news report,
"Diversity need not be a handicap." Then he added, "We can find a com-
mon ground." Not The two statements are in conflict. That they are in con-
flict logically is not the concern. The important concern is that the
statements are in conflict with designing relevant criteria. This kind of
"common ground" thinking leads either to abstract, mushy criteria that
will not fit any context well, and thus accomplishes very little, or to a firm
set of criteria that ignore the beliefs and unique associations of certain
groups. When such groups are silenced institutionally by being ignored,
criteria cannot be properly drawn. Such marginalization, in addition,
leads to anger and civil unrest, a situation that has become more common
recently. The ripping and tearing of our social fabric because of cavalier
criteria contributes to the social disruption and violence that is engulfing
local streets and communities as well as global relationships.
Mandates
One issue that has encouraged my interest in criteria at this time is
the battle with regard to mandates. Some of the difficulty has occurred be-
cause the mandates from the central government have often been stated
in terms of rules, flow levels, and requirements to take a particular action
or to establish a particular technical procedure: for example, if the central
government requires a waste treatment plant for every city of a certain
size or vaccination of every person. Such mandates ignore contextual
variety. Treatment plants may not be necessary if the city does not
generate a high level of waste or if the natural environment is robust
enough to cleanse the water without treatment. Everyone may not need to
be vaccinated if some are from affluent families and have already received
their vaccinations.
The more instrumentally correct approach would be for the central
government to define and establish criteria for the local governments, cor-
porations, and families to use in making judgments and decisions; for ex-
ample, criteria about being free from a particular disease or maintaining
clean water. In this way, these institutions can be more creative in
designing alternative ways to meet the criteria. More importantly, they
can respond to the criteria consistent with the relevant context.
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In contrast to the centralized mandate approach, some champions of
local government have overlooked the necessity for the central govern-
ment and constitutional bodies to mandate criteria at all. An example is
Eleanor Ostrom who, in her book Crafting Institutions [1992], a book that
I generally recommend, explains that in crafting institutions for irrigation
systems, all the multiple layers of government should be making rules for
the success of such irrigation systems. She outlines three levels of rules:
(1) operational rules, which directly affect the day-to-day decisions of
water users and suppliers at the local level; (2) collective-choice rules,
which indirectly affect operational rules through policymaking, manage-
ment, and policy adjudication rules; and (3) constitutional-choice rules,
which determine who is eligible to participate in the system and what
specific rules will be used to craft the set of collective-choice rules, which
in turn affect the set of operational rules [Ostrom 1992,45].
Ostrom's paradigm depends exclusively on rule making, an excessive
dependence for two reasons. First, constitutional action is finalized main-
ly through judicial judgments, and the latter are mainly finalized by the
provision of criteria for other bodies to use in making decisions. Thus, the
idea of constitutional rules being the dominant mode is inconsistent with
the experience mode of judicial bodies. Second, Ostrom has indicated that
most rules must be made at the local level in order to allow for the diverse
kinds of decisions that must accompany the diverse contexts at the local
level. As she correctly states, rules codified by external administrative
agencies, national legislation, and the judicial arena rarely reflect the par-
ticular circumstance of a particular system [Ostrom 1992, 47]. If most
rules must be made at the operational level, and if mandates from the col-
lective legislative and judicial bodies are needed, then how can the desired
effect be achieved when bodies have only been provided with rule-making
functions? It cannot. Thus, the collective policymaking and judicial bodies
need to depend more on criteria. Criteria can be established without es-
tablishing special rules; thus, creativity can be used to define rules, tech-
nology, and institutions for the local situations.
One of the problems of the new institutional economics is the way its
authors envision structuring local and central governance functions. They
hope that governance can emerge from the nodes in the social network to
the center, usually through tactical decisions rather than through policy
criteria. Institutionalists, however, understand that constitutional and
collective governance must be from the center out. The center should em-
phasize policy criteria rather than particular rules and design them, as
stated above, for a pluralistic world.
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Social Setting and Instrumental Competency
The reality of pluralistic multisocietalism and multiculturalism makes
the recommendation for ethnocentricity impossible. Recently a few in-
stitutionalists have insisted that instrumentalists should not be involved
in instrumental policy analysis except in their own native setting. For
them, an instrumentalist must not conduct policy analysis outside his or
her own societal and cultural milieu. This view is termed "ethnocentrism"
in philosophy literature, or to use the language of Eco, the interpretant of
foreign instrumental scholars is negative. "Foreign" in this case is defined
as anyone from a different society or culture, irrespective of their national
status. The ethnocentric view has been proclaimed without explanation
about why foreigners are unable to conduct policy analysis in, for ex-
ample, the United States, and without consulting epistemological or
policymaking literature.
The first way in which this view fails is that it does not address scien-
tific criteria to inform us what criteria were utilized to arrive at its con-
clusions. For example, many instrumentalists do not accept the possibility
of the scientific criteria of coherence and correspondence [see Bush 1993;
Schlagel 1986]. Does the ethnocentric view? What about other criteria
such as falsifiability, consistency, charity, extensibility, external validity,
and so forth? The criteria have not been defined, explained, or justified by
the ethnocentrists.
The second failure is that the characteristics of foreigners that make
them unable to apply instrumentalism at the U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice or the Congressional Research Office are never explained. Women and
men come from India, Japan, Africa, and China, for example, and excel in
areas such as plastic surgery, shopping center construction, corporate
finance, cattle ranch management, and so forth. Yet, it is claimed that
there is some, as yet undefined, aspect that makes it impossible for
foreign persons to excel as instrumental policy scientists.
Third, the empirical evidence indicates that the ethnocentristic view
fails when tested in real-world agencies. Women and men from around
the world, who have gained expertise as instrumental institutionalists,
are functioning very well as policy analysts and policymakers in federal,
state, and local government agencies in the United States. What
documentation exists that these persons, some of whom are members of
our Association, are failures? None that I have been able to discover.
Finally, with regard to our main concern, the ethnocentric view is in-
consistent with the reality of the policymaking world. As Nancy Levit has
explained, the criteria of inquiry leads to a more communalist, rather
than atomistic, resolution of problems because they favor more complex
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and contextual explanations rather than anachronistic self-contained
solutions [1989, 2731 In addition, as explained above, seldom can we find
a problem in the modern world that is not cross-societal or cross-cultural.
Criteria should be drawn on a cross-societal and cross-cultural basis be-
cause problems are cross-societal and cross-cultural. Thus, all analysts
should deal with the beliefs and values of others in a real-world policy
context and design criteria with the guidance offoreign beliefs and values.
Dealing with others' beliefs and social structures cannot be avoided by in-
strumental policy analysts. As policy analysts, we are all foreigners.
Because of the focus on validation in pragmatism and because of the
communal nature of policy analysis, there are numerous safeguards
within the process itself against individual subjectivity gaining the upper
hand. As Schlagel has stated with regard to the applied pragmatic
criterion, because problems are intersubjectively identified, and "the
criteria of their solution ... subject to intractable external constraints
with publically accessible evidence ..., the application of this criterion is
no more susceptible to subjective abuse-and is no less rigorous-than any
other criterion" [Schlagel 1986, 2361
To deal with someone else's societal interests does not mean that the
analyst must agree with their societal structure. Let us assume that some
Winnebagos become instrumentalists and go to work for the federal gov-
ernment to do policy analysis on the problems identified by the current
mainstream population in the United States. To make judgments about
the mainstream's rationality, the Winnebagos need not insist that the
mainstream natives' system of thought parallel their own in content [see
Katz 1989, 269]. "What is required, and what makes the native's set of
beliefs, actions and utterances count as rational, is not their content but
their systematic nature" [Katz 1989, 269]. Instrumental policy analysts
can develop consistent systematic models (as explained with Figures 1
and 2 above) for describing and evaluating policies without agreeing with
the beliefs of all agents involved. Indeed they must, if the policy domain is
committed to democratic pluralism, because there are numerous different
societal and cultural components that are overlapped in a problem con-
text.
Science Is a Policy Area
The last section will comment on science as policy. Science is an area of
policymaking, and scientists aspire to be accurate policymakers with ex-
plicit criteria. A spectrum of writing, ranging from that of Gjessling
Gustrom [1968] to that of Stephen Gould [1991], emphasizes that science
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is influenced by the conceptual system of the culture and society. Science,
like other policymaking areas, is directed, constrained, and controlled by
normative social criteria. It is conducted by a community of inquirers with
similar policies, strategies, and tactics for scientific activities [Hayden
1993, 294-301]. "The belief in an independent, self-subsistent universe,
knowable at least in principle, provided the ontological setting for most
scientific inquiry and philosophic speculation in the West, until recently,
as Dewey persuasively argues in the Quest for Certainty" [Schlagel 1986,
203]. A few decades ago, young economics recruits were drilled in the
beliefs of the objective logical positivists with their catechism of belief
criteria about coherence, correspondence, external verification, logic, and
so forth. As Ernan McMullin said of logical positivism: "It was, perhaps,
the most ambitious foundationalism in the entire history of philosophy,
outdoing even that of Aristotle. And as we know, it collapsed" [1974, 658].
Science today is organized around an array of various sets of normative
propositions that, in turn, are organized around an array directed by dif-
ferent integrated sets of beliefs and is practiced through an array of con-
textual criteria. "There are many other criteria involved in science besides
those of valid argument" [McMullin 1974,669]. Institutionalist science, as
a world theory, is holistic, instrumentalist or pragmatic, integrative, and
evolutionary. "Insofar as a world theory stakes out intellectual claims,
either explicitly or implicitly, it purports to be knowledge, and as such it
is subject to the criteria for meaning and knowledge whatever those
criteria may be" [Lee 1983, 151]. Scientific criteria are policy standards
for scientific rationality and interpretation. "The mistake of the logical
positivists was to reduce rationality to logicality in the hope of making
verification a simple and noncontroversial affair, thus making possible a
conveniently sharp line of demarcation between science and the fuzzier
sorts of human activity. But even at the very level of observation, there is
the matter of choosing the concepts in terms of which the observation will
be expressed ..." [McMullin 1974,671].
Because of the relationship between science and the contextual
framework, "science cannot, in consequence, be constructed in logicalist or
foundationalist terms" [McMullin 1974, 675]. This means we should no
longer talk in terms of truth or not truth but rather in terms of being
valid or not valid, or making warranted or nonwarranted assertions. Are
the findings valid in terms of the normative criteria and context selected?
Foundationalists, like their fundamentalist counterparts in the religious
world, claim there are basic foundations or fundamental truths that are
given. When we observe more closely, however, what is assumed to be
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truth apart from societal beliefs is usually consistent with mainstream
societal beliefs and cultural values.
As with other policymaking areas, human institutions provide the
criteria and context of science. Scientific criteria and context are policy
decisions made by the bureaucracies of research universities, corporate
financing sources, and other institutions. Today, the normative criteria of
science are dispensed more and more, along with the massive sum of
money for doing the research, from government bureaucracies that have
the legal and ethical responsibility to direct scientific research. In addi-
tion, scientific journals endorse policy criteria directives through the ar-
ticles accepted and through the evaluation process. When I receive a
submitted paper to evaluate for a journal, I receive a list of policy criteria
that are to be applied in making the evaluation. Science does not take
place in a vacuum. The actors called scientists are cultural and social ac-
tors. Science is organized in social institutions; sciencing is a social policy
process. Thus, the fierce battles about scientific policy criteria are impor-
tant.
The basic social beliefs and normative policy criteria of science are ex-
tremely important today because scientific findings are very influential in
general, and because different scientific criteria give us different socio-
ecological results. If we return to Figure 2, we are reminded that scientific
policy criteria inconsistent with other areas will damage the other areas.
For example, the United States could not have survived as a democracy
had the tests and experiments the scientists conducted around 1900 based
on I.Q. test results, which found Jews and Italians inferior, been allowed
to stand. Likewise, our system will not be allowed to prosper if the
neoclassical standard of the market is to be the scientific criterion for
making judgments about ecological systems policy, or educational policy,
or international trade agreement policy, or whatever. Kathryn George em-
phasizes that what is defined to be sustainable agriculture depends on
which members of the community select the criteria to guide the scientific
work for determining sustainable practices [George 1992, 48-57]. The
same is true of other areas. Scientific knowledge is not discovered; it is
created through the application of beliefs and scientific policy criteria. The
models that are identified as the context corresponding to the relevant
problem are created and selected by the scientists. This means science,
and therefore scientific knowledge, is not a consequence of idle curiosity.
"Science advances by adopting the instruments and doings of directed
practice, and the knowledge thus gained becomes a means of the develop-
ment of arts which bring nature still further into actual and potential ser-
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vice of human purposes and valuations" [Dewey 1929, 85]. Thus, to use
Dewey's term, science is a "directed activity."1
Conclusion
For the directed activity of policymaking to be successful, criteria are
needed for judging the various alternatives available for achieving a solu-
tion to the problem at hand in a manner that is consistent with the
communities' standards of morality and justice. As stated above, for policy
criteria to fulfill this role, they need to be embedded in the context of
pluralistic social beliefs and overlapping institutions.
The approach explained here is inconsistent with the narrow ideologi-
cal approach so prevalent in neoclassical economics in recent decades.
Neoclassicalists have endorsed a narrow set of policy criteria to confine
and overpower the rich criterial texture found in our pluralistic world.
Karl Polanyi, in his Great Transformation, one of the most important
books written in the twentieth century, explained the dangers of allowing
the narrow criteria of a market system to overpower other social criteria.
To avoid the repression and subjugation of the community requires that
the multitude of social beliefs be given standing in policy judgments. This
is an arduous policy task, but the alternative is the destructive approach
of adopting criteria external to contextual reality. Formulating criteria for
our instrumentalist policy framework is a huge research undertaking;
however, it is exceeded by the larger adverse policy consequences that fol-
low without it.
Notes
1. The scientific approach presented here appears to be consistent with the
problem-oriented approach of instrumentalism explained by Kurt Dofer. He
explains how scientific paradigms deal with new problems and questions in
order to adjust, or fail to adjust, their paradigms when presented with
evidence that conflicts with an accepted scientific ideology [Dofer 1991,541-
544]. The combination of x and a in his Figure 2 [po 543], reproduced as Fig-
ure 3 below, appears to perform the same function as the Problem level in
Figures 1 and 2 above.
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Figure 3. Ideology: External Challenges and Self-Referential
Closure Judgment
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A
A - Global Closure Structure
a - Local Issue Point
ex - Closure Judgment, "Single Exit" Response Function
x - Inquiry, Challenge from External World
Source: Dofer [1991, 540].
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